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transportation network when the network is subjected to interdiction by aircraft.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In conventional or limited warfare the success or failure of a military
campaign is directly dependent on abilities to transport material some distance
overland within the required delivery time. This is particularly true in the case of
armed aggression by one nation upon a contiguous or near — contiguous nation, such
as might happen in the Korean Peninsula.
The goal of military road network managers is to minimize the time required
to transport war materials to their front line troops. The opposing or interdicting
forces try to interdict some of the roads to maximize the transit time between the
supply source and the front lines by using a variety of means, particularly airstrikes.
If the transit time is greater than the required delivery time, the front line troops
must either curtail their activity or retreat from the frontal area. Accordingly, it is
to the advantage of the interdicting forces to delay the movement of materials as
long as possible.
The interdiction forces' target planner knows that the time when a target is
hit is as important as which target is hit. In addition, partial destruction of a target
using fewer resources may be sufficient for the immediate objective instead of total
destruction with an attendant larger number of resources.
Because the application of tactical air interdiction is probably the most
effective method of denying the enemy vital war supplies, we will consider airstrikes
as our only interdiction means.
The extent to which a target is destroyed is unknown when airstrikes are
planned. Aircraft may be shot down by anti-aircraft fire of the road managing
forces, they may be prevented from completely destroying the target by defensive
gunnery or missiles, or they may fail to completely destroy the target due to human
error. Therefore, the level of the success of an attack is probabilistic. As a result of
the probabilistic success of attack, repair times, bypass construction times, and
transit times after interdiction will also be probabilistic. We will assume that , once
the probability of success of attack is known, these three times will be known for
certain.
In this thesis, we study the probabilistic dynamics of a road network
transportation problem through the use of simulation methodology. We consider
several road interdiction schemes and compare these schemes both by using
deterministic expected value optimization techniques and by simulation. We will
demonstrate, through the use of two realistic military examples, that the
deterministic results poorly predict network transit time of the stochastic network
and that the bias incurred by using deterministic methods is significant.
Chapter II briefly discusses the assumptions, objective functions, and
algorithms of earlier interdiction techniques and models.
Chapter III includes the network description, problem formulation of a
deterministic model, the solution procedure for that model and an example.
Chapter IV describes the stochastic network model for which the transit time
between source and sink is dependent upon the probabilistic success of an
interdiction attack.
Chapter V explains details of the simulation program such as the random
number generator and the generation of random transit times.
Chapter VI presents two realistic networks as examples, explains the
network data file for each in detail, compares the results from the deterministic and
simulation method, and conducts a sensitivity analysis between two models.
Chapter VII presents a summary and conclusions.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Current literature in the field of networks contains several different measures
of effectiveness for interdicting a military transportation system. These measures
include the maximum delay of material transit, the greatest reduction to the
maximum flow, and the least accumulated flow over the specified operational
period. All of these measures involve single source to single sink, single commodity
flows.
Nugent [Ref 1] presented a method of solving the problem of allocation of
effort in the interdiction of a transportation network under the assumption that the
damage function was deterministic and exponential. For example, even if a bridge
is destroyed, it may still be possible to ford or ferry supplies across a river. The
exponential damage function exhibits a decreasing marginal return from interdiction
efforts. In addition, he assumed a planar network, divisible effort, single time
period, and no storage or depot capability. His objective function was to maximize
the reduction in the enemy's resupply capability subject to a constrained number of
simultaneous airstrikes. Nugent used the maximal—flow minimal cut theorem and
the topological dual to determine which route to select. He did not consider the
probability of success of an attack. He used the expected values of flow over a given
road segment. As we shall indicate, this use of expected flows detracts from the
accuracy of Nugent's results and methods. Finally, he assumed the road managing
force would repair the interdicted roads so that they are operational some time after
an interdiction.
Sullivan [Ref. 2] developed a method to maximize the time required for an
enemy to deliver war material to the front line troops. Any attack was considered
completely successful, i.e., the target was fully destroyed. Repair and bypass
construction times were assumed to be known linearly decreasing functions of time.
He assumed that the resulting transit time over repaired arcs or constructed
bypasses was always more than the uninterdicted transit times.
Assuming certain success of all interdicting actions, he was able to solve a
deterministic time—dependent shortest route problem using the method of Cooke
and Halsey [Ref. 3]. The solution method used by Sullivan was to select a set of
arcs to attack based on marginal increases in the source—to—sink delivery delay
time.
Mustin [Ref. 4] assumed that upper and lower limits on road capacities, as
well as the amount of reduction per sortie, were known deterministically, and the
reduction in capacity per sortie was linear between the upper and lower limits of
capacity with the latter being positive. The goal of interdicting forces was to
prevent the build—up of supplies over a 24—hour period. A computational procedure
was developed for determining the optimum strike plan for minimizing network flow
capacity. The work of Mustin, Sullivan, and Nugent were all masters' theses at the
Naval Postgraduate School under the direction of Alan McMasters.
Wollmer [Ref. 5] presented two algorithms for targeting strikes in a
lines-of-communication (LOG) network. He assumed that the user of the LOCs is
attempting to achieve a circulation flow at minimum cost, a very general goal that
includes, as special cases, maximizing flow between two points, meeting required
flows between two points at minimum cost, and combinations of these two. One
possibility is to assume all strikes allocated against a particular arc are directed
against the same target and each has an identical and independent probability of
successfully destroying it. The expected result of the attack is then used in an
optimization scheme to maximize the minimum cost of communication.
His algorithms attempt to make such arc costs as large as possible over time
while decreasing arc capacities. The first algorithm considers arc costs as linear
functions of flow; the second considers arc costs as piecewise linear functions of flow
with one break point. Allocation is done on the basis of immediate user cost, repair
times, and repair cost. Specifically, if a single strike is to be targeted, it is directed
against an arc of maximum strike value, where strike value is defined as the repair
cost plus the resulting cost increase per unit time of a minimum—cost circulation
flow multiplied by the repair time. For multiple strikes, no method for allocating
strikes optimally, other than complete enumeration, is known. Wollmer solved the
problem heuristically by repeated application of the one—strike algorithm.
In Sengoku [Ref. 6], two new indices measuring the degree of influence of the
arc on the vulnerability of the network were studied. He also assumed the
interdiction of each arc was deterministically successful.
The Network Interdiction Model (NIM) [Ref. 7] is a strategic military
decision support system which treats three criteria; the maximum delay the
interdicted targets would cause, the greatest reduction to the maximum flow, and
the least accumulated flow over the specified operational period.
Most of the approaches discussed above were concerned with "deterministic
expected values," that is, the expected level of success of an attack was designated
deterministically. Some of them assumed that the targets are struck one at a time
sequentially. This thesis will examine a stochastic system which incorporates the
probability of success of an attack and simultaneous attacks. In the next chapter,
the algorithm for determining the time—dependent lengths of arcs will be developed.




The transportation system can be represented by a network of arcs and
nodes. Nodes represent interactions of road segments. Further, they may be used
to represent any point at which it is convenient to distinguish between the road
characteristics on either side of the node. Arcs represent road segments. Each arc
joins two nodes; that is, each is characterized by a beginning node and an ending
node. The network is assumed to have undirected capacitated arcs.
Two special nodes are the source and sink. The network is assumed to have
a single source through which flow enters and a single sink through which flow
leaves. If there are several sources or sinks, this may be taken care of by adding
artificial nodes and arcs. The capacities of these artificial arcs are infinite and they
are not vulnerable to attack.
We are interested in the transportation times between the source and the
sink after several arcs in the network have been attacked and destroyed.
We will follow the network descriptions given in the Sullivan thesis[Ref 2].
The notation (i, j) represents the arc between nodes i and j. Nodes are numbered
from 1 to n with 1 for the source and n for the sink. The intermediate nodes have
any of the values between 1 and n. There exists a transit time, d--, for each arc
based upon road conditions, terrain, and time of day. Engineering units are
stationed at several prespecified nodes in the network. These units must first travel
to an attacked arc, and then perform the repair or make a bypass. Thus, each arc
will have attributes of time to move between the closest engineering unit location
and the damaged arc, time to repair, or time to construct a bypass. Let
m.. = time to move between the engineering unit location and the damaged
arc (i, j),
r.. = time to repair the destroyed structure in arc (i, j),
b-. = time to construct a bypass in the arc (i, j),
c.. = m--
-I- r.. [or, b--], time to recover the destroyed arc (i, j),
c-.(t) = time remaining to recover arc (i, j) at time t,
d..(r) = transit time over arc (i, j) once it has been repaired,
d.-(b) = transit time over a newly constructed bypass of arc (i, j)
The values of d|-(r) and d..(b) are assumed to be greater than or equal to the
uninterdicted transit times, d... This is a reasonable assumption since bypass
construction is usually inferior to the original road segment, thus slowing traffic.
Furthermore, even with a segment fully repaired, a vehicle may have a tendency to
travel at a slower pace in an area that has recently undergone a bombing attack.
The transit time can vary with types of military column formations. A
fundamental for convoy command and control is that the column be organized to
meet the mission requirements and provide the degree of control necessary. The
convoy commander decides how his column will be organized for control, choosing
from three basic methods: Close Column, Open Column, Infiltration.
The difference in formation depends largely on vehicle spacing. The number
of vehicles (density) per kilometer of road and the rate of march are accepted
numbers (values) for average conditions when a movement is not influenced by
attacking forces' actions. However, weather, tactical situation, attacking forces'
capability, condition and type of road, vehicular maintenance, types of vehicles, and
command policies may cause changes in average densities and speeds. [Ref. 8: p. 5-^j
This thesis will assume the open column which is applicable for a normal supply
support situation.
Although any segment of a road is subject to attack, a highway segment
that, after attack by strike aircraft, will be extremely difficult to repair or bypass is
called a choke point. In other words, choke points are segments in a network which
once attacked, force an enemy to either reroute traffic or expend large amounts of
resources to keep the attacked segment open to traffic. Typical choke points would
be bridges, mountain roads, and tunnels. In case no choke points exist in an arc,
normal roads are selected for the targets. Each arc is assumed to have a unique
attractive target for interdiction. Bypass and recovery times are based on the
extent of the destruction of this target.
Immediately following interdiction of a road segment, the arc transit time
value becomes a function of recovery time. Therefore, after interdiction, the transit
time over arc (i, j) will be defined by:
djj(t) = min [cjj(t) + djj(r), Cjj(t) + djj(b)]
where t represents the earliest clocktime after attack that a vehicle can depart from
the source and arrive at the point of interdiction. The function which is minimized
guides the road network manager in deciding how to get the arc back into operation.
If c..(t) + d.-(r) < Cj.(t) 4- d..(b), then the road manager will choose to repair the
road segment. Conversely, if c-.(t) + d..(r) > c..(t) + d-.(b), then the manager will
choose to construct a bypass around the interdicted point.
An attack is not always successful. An attack may have no effect, it may
leave the road damaged but passable, it may cause the road to be impassable with
minor repairs, or it may completely destroy the target, necessitating lengthy repairs
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to restore the road's usefulness. We will call these levels of attack success no
destruction, ruts, partial, and complete, respectively. Accordingly, the recovery time
and the transit time after recovery will be different.
B. DETERMINISTIC PROBLEM FORMULATION
Road network managers want to minimize the time required to transport war
material to his front line troops while attacking forces try to maximize the time
between source and sink by interdicting this supply operation with airstrikes.
If we assume that the success of each airstrike is known, we could solve a
deterministic optimization problem which would give us the length of the required
transit time. One method for solving this problem is linear programming, a well
known method for performing optimization on networks. However, there exists a
special purpose algorithm for this particular optimization problem due to Cooke and
Halsey [Ref. 3]. This method was used by Sullivan [Ref. 2].
C. SOLUTION TECHNIQUE
To determine the shortest transit time for a given set of points of
interdiction, the Cooke and Halsey algorithm compares the repair and construction
bypass functions for each damaged segment along the route. The "length" of
interdicted arc is then replaced with d..(t). The arcs are assumed to be attacked
simultaneously within available air sorties.
The algorithm is given in the following steps.
1. Choose the arc sets to attack.
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2. The transit time of the arc to be interdicted is replaced by the time
dependent length function
dj.(t) = Cjj(t) + djj(r),
if repair is optimal; otherwise,
dj.(t) = Cjj(t) + dj.(b).
The problem is now time dependent in nature.
3. Define the new tentative node label f. to be an upper bound on the
earliest time of arrival at node i, and permanent label, f.^, to be the earliest possible
(optimal) time of arrival.
4. Permanently label node 1 (source) with a value of f = and label all
other nodes with values of infinity; i. e.,
f(o)^oP f(o)^ =f(o)^„h ^ ' ^2 - n °°-
5. Tentatively label all nodes j with the minimum of the current node label
f| and the sum of f. and d, .(t)
;
i.e.,
f/l) = min [ t^ + di.(fjP), f/") ).
6. Find the minimum tentative node label; i.e., f, and declare it permanent.
f P = minf.(l).
7. Node k, the new permanent node, is then used to attempt to reduce the
labels at all tentatively labeled nodes by comparing f, ^ + d, .(f, P) to the current
label. The minimum new temporary label is declared permanent and used as a basis
for the next iteration; i.e.,
f/™) = min [f^P + dy(f,P), £/"-!) ];
f P = minf.K
8 Terminate when node n is permanently labeled.
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If the network is composed of N arcs and s arcs can be interdicted, there
N
exist C possible interdiction sets. The interdiction set which has the maximum
value of f *^ contains the optimal points of attack for the transportation network so
as to maximize the time required for the road manager to transport war material to
his front line troops. This is the optimal solution to the dual of the road manager's
problem.
D. EXAMPLE
Consider the simplified uninterdicted transportation network described by
Figure 1. All transit times ( d-. ) are in minutes, and nodes 1 and 6 will be the
source and sink nodes, respectively.
d12 = 30
Figure 1. An Example Network.
We believe that the most realistic planning model involves the assignment of
a number of aircraft sorties to different network arcs so as to perform a single,
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simultaneous airstrike. Thus, for our example it is assumed that exactly two arcs
can be attacked simultaneously at time with allocated air sorties.
1. The arc set, (2, 4) and (3, 5), will be interdicted.
2. fj(") = 0, t2(') = 30, £3(2) = 40.
3. The arc to be interdicted is replaced by the time function. Figure 2 shows
the results.
Suppose that arc (2, 4) has the following data:
m24 = 20,
b24 = 200, d24(b) = 70.
Next, m24 + 124 + d24(r) = 260 < m24 4- b24 + d24(b) = 290.
So, C24 = m24 + 124 ~ ^^^' ^ ^^^ ^^^^ manager will choose repair. )





d 35(b) = 80
f5 =280
fr =25°
Figure 2. Time-Dependent Network.
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According to the time—dependent function,
C24(f2) = 170, d24(f2) = C24(f2) + d24(r) = 230.
Next, suppose the data for arc (3, 5) is
^35 = 30'
135 = 200, d^^ii) = 70,
b35 = 180, d35(b) = 80.
Then, m3^ + r^^ +
^s^^^) = ^^^ > "^35 + ^35 + ^35^^) = ^^^•
S^'
^35 = ^35 + ^35 = 210.
C35(f3) = 170, d35(f3) = 250.
4. By using the above results, f^^"^^ = 260, f^^'^^ = 280, fg^^^ = 290.
The road manager would send his supplies over the shortest route after
interdiction. For this example that route is 1 — 2 — 4 — 6. Before sending these
supplies he must repair arc (2, 4). He can send supplies out from node 1 at time
zero but the trucks will have to wait at node 2 for 170 time units until the arc is
repaired. The other alternative is to wait at node 1 for 170 time units before
departing to node 2. If this tactic is used then the arc (2, 4) will just be repaired as
the trucks arrive at node 2.
In the next chapter, we will consider a model in which the success of a given
attack is random, and observe the effects of these attacks on source—to—sink transit
time.
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IV. STOCHASTIC NETWORK MODEL
The assumption that any attack is considered completely successful is far
from the real situation. The target damage may be complete, partial, or only ruts
in the road may result from a successful weapon delivery. Also aircraft may be shot
down by ground anti-aircraft gunfire or by defensive air patrol interceptors of the
road managing forces. Probabilities of kill on the target vary with the levels of
pilots' skill, the opponent's defensive gunfire, the exposure time of an aircraft, the
type of munition, hardness of target, and so on. Therefore, the level of the success
of an attack must be modeled as probabilistic or random instead of assuming that
we always have completely successful destruction of the target.
As a result of random successes, repair times, bypass construction time, and
transit times after interdiction will also be random variables. Repair times and
bypass times will be designated according to the probability of success of attack,
i.e., the level of damage on the target. In case of no damage or ruts only, the
construction time will be 0. The values after complete destruction are assumed to
be greater than or equal to the values after partial destruction. Also, the transit
time after interdiction will be influenced by the success of the attack. Even though
the interdicted arc is recovered fully, a convoy column commander may have a
tendency to travel at a slower pace in an area that has recently undergone a
devastating bombing attack because of the psychological effects of being
demonstrably vulnerable. It is assumed that the transit times associated with the
rut case are larger than the other transit times. This is a reasonable assumption
16
since the road manager will probably not repair a roadway having only minor
destruction.
To reiterate, the transit and recovery times of the attacked arcs are random
variables which are a function of the effectiveness of the attack. Once the attack's
success is known, the transit time and the reconstruction time will be known with
certainty.
When faced with random network arc performance, most analysts decide to
take the expected value of the arc performance and use this expected value as if it
were a deterministic quantity. The expected value is thus input into a deterministic
network optimization scheme such as the Cooke and Halsey algorithm above, and
the result is reported as the expected value solution. Several of the papers cited in
the literature review, particularly Wollmer [Ref. 5], have such published results.
Using expected values in cases such as maximum flow or shortest path
problems can be shown to give extremely inaccurate results. To show this we will
solve a network maximal flow problem using the expected values and the simulated
results. The details are presented in Appendix A. For the simulations we used
coins and dice to generate random capacities and calculated the resulting random
maximum flows. We also calculated the expected value of the capacity of each arc's
capacity and computed the maximum flow on the network using those expected
capacities.
As we can see from Table 3 of Appendix A, the result of using the expected
capacities is to produce incorrect solutions. The amount of flow calculated using the
expected values is 10 and is greater than the result of the average of 6.27 from the
stochastic simulation after 30 experiments or trials by a factor of 37.3 per cent.
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Using expected values in place of random variables would lead the transportation
manager to overestimate his ability to transport goods.
At this point, we can predict similar results for the transit time. We expect
that the transportation forces will be able to transport goods to the front much
faster than we would be lead to believe had we used the expected time of transit for
each arc. This result implies that the algorithms used in all of the deterministic
models described in our literature search may not be as efficient as reported. The
goal of the remainder of this thesis is to demonstrate this for the Cooke and Halsey
algorithm. Chapter VI will demonstrate that the expected transit times are bigger
than values calculated using the simulation program we will describe in Chapter V.
18
V. DISCUSSION OF SIMULATION PROGRAM
If the relationships which comprise the model are simple enough, it may be
possible to use analytical methods (such as algebra, calculus or probability theory)
to obtain exact information on questions of interest. However, most real—world
systems are too complex to allow the models to be evaluated analytically, and these
models must be studied by means of computer simulation. In a simulation we use a
computer to evaluate a model numerically over a time period of interest, and data
are gathered to estimate the desired true characteristics of the model. [Ref. 9: p.l]
A simulation model is said to be deterministic if it contains no random
variables. For a deterministic model, there is a unique set of model output data for
a given set of inputs. On the other hand, a simulation model is stochastic if it
contains one or more random variables. The output data for a stochastic model are
themselves random and thus only estimates of the true characteristics of the model.
[Ref. 9: p. 3]. Our model will be stochastic because the attack successes are random.
The output data we will collect are the transit times from the source to the sink,
thus our output is indeed random. We will compute statistics based on this data
such as the sample mean and sample variance. Our program allows us to specify the
number of statistics we desire.
A. PROGRAM OVERVIEW
We wrote our simulation program in Professional FORTRAN, by Ryan
McFarland. The program was implemented on an IBM PC compatible computer.
Our program begins by inputting the network data file which contains all of the
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relevant information for the problem. We then enter a loop in which the
pseudorandom attack successes are calculated. The resulting deterministic
time—dependent shortest path problem is generated and solved using the Cooke and
Halsey algorithm, and the resulting shortest path length is recorded.
This loop is repeated the specified number of times. From the recorded
statistics, the sample mean and sample variance are calculated and an output file is
built which contains the problem, iteration results, and the statistical results.
Appendix B contains a listing of the simulation program. We now provide some
more detail concerning each stage of the program.
B. NETWORK DATA FILE
As we can see in the Appendix C, the network data file (Table 6) includes
the following information concerning the network itself: source, sink, number of
nodes, number of arcs, the tail (T) and head (H) node of each arc. For each set of
attacked arcs, we specify the recovery times for each type of destruction for each
arc (c(l), c(2), c(3), c(4)), the transit time before destruction (d(0)), the transit
times after recovery according to the success of attack (d(l), d(2), d(3), d(4)), the
arc set attacked, and the probability of each type of destruction is given for each arc
(p(l), p(2), p(3), p(4)). Thus, for each attacked set, we have the option of changing
any relevant recovery or transit time data.
C. RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR
Because the success of attack is probabilistic, we utilize pseudorandom
numbers, which is conceptually equivalent to flipping coins or rolling dice. This
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stochastic model will use the linear congruential method (LCM) which is one of the
most effective and popular types of random number generators. The FORTRAN
function RAND() of the program is for generating random numbers.
LAST is the seed which is a locally saved variable. Its value is updated
throughout execution of the subroutine that uses RAND. LAST has the value that
depends on its previous value and the formula involving LAST, C, and xM. The
value of LAST will be between and xM—1 (inclusive) and will be suitably random
for proper choices of the constant values xM, C and the starting value of LAST.
The values of 29, 217, and 1024 for LAST, C, and xM, respectively, as in RAND,
define a usable LCM random number generator. [Ref. 11: pp. 175—178]
With these values of LAST, C, and xM, the function RAND will generate
pseudorandom numbers which are approximately uniform on the interval [0, 1].
Because of our relatively small sample sizes, cycle length was not an issue. As an
experiment, we also used the recommended generator in Press, Flannery, Teukolsky,
and Ve Herling [Ref. 11]. Our results did not differ significantly using these values
for LAST, C, and xM.
D. GENERATION OF A RANDOM PROBLEM
We will use different values for different arcs because each arc has different
distance, defensive posture, hardness of target, and so on. From these known
probabilities we can then construct the associated random number intervals. This
process is summarized in Table 1. Suppose that the random number 0.47 is
generated, then Table 1 would give the result that the arc was partially damaged.
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No Damage 0.20 0.20 0.00 - 0.20
Ruts Only 0.20 0.40 0.21 - 0.40
Partial 0.50 0.90 0.41 - 0.90
Complete 0.10 1.00 0.91 - 1.00
If the arc sets to attack are decided upon, the probability of success of attack
will be designated from using the random number generator and Table 1.
Accordingly, the data file then provides the recovery time and the transit time after
recovery. Finally, by using the Cooke and Halsey algorithm, we can get the transit
time from source to sink.
E. STATISTICAL PROCEDURES
At the end of each series of simulation runs, the subroutine STATS
calculates the sample mean and sample variance as well as the 90% and 95% normal
confidence intervals for the source—sink transit time. Note that this implies that
the simulation model should not be used with less than 30 iterations if one truly
desires normal confidence interval results. We determined that, with 200 samples,
most of our confidence intervals for the mean transportation time were reasonably
tight. Although increasing sample size would have tightened these intervals further,
we chose to keep the sample size the same for all cases in the interest of uniformity.
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VI. TWO EXAMPLES
In this chapter, we will compaxe the deterministic model and the stochastic
model for two realistic situations: the road network between Kaeseong and Sariwon
in North Korea (Example 1) and the road network between Gilroy and Carmel
Valley Village in Central California (Example 2). We made reasonable assumptions
about moving times, bypass and repair times, and transit times as input into the
simulation program. This input we call the network data file. We will first explain
the procedure of constructing the network data file. We will then compare the
outputs of two models, analyze the results, and interpret what the differences
between two models represent.
A. FEATURES COMMON TO BOTH EXAMPLES
It is assumed that the probability of each level of destruction is known and is
the same for each arc. The values we selected were shown in Table 1 of the last
chapter.
It is assumed that the size of the operational unit in both examples is one
North Korean infantry division. The theater—level average consumption rates in a
temperate zone are given as 123.7 pounds per person per day [Ref. 12: p.2—5]. If we
assume that the number of personnel of the North Korean infantry division is
10,000, the amount of cargo needed to support such a division would be 1,237,000
pounds per day.
Let's assume that the North Korean Army uses trucks which have the same
payload and cubic capacity as the South Korean cargo truck, M35A2, 2 1/2—ton.
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Its payload is 10,000 pounds on a paved highway and 5,000 pounds offroad [Ref. 8:
p. 1—7]. We will consider only the highway case in this example. The number of
trucks required to move 1,237,000 pounds is 128.
We also assume that the transit time once an arc has been repaired and the
transit time over a newly constructed bypass are equal, thus d..(b) = d..(r) for each
arc (i, j). Although the level of damage, hence the recovery time will be different
for each arc, we assumed damage levels which were the same for each arc in our
examples. In any operational use of this methodology, we must account for varying
levels of damage. Table 2 shows the common degree of damage and recovery time
in case of full destruction for each type of target.
TABLE 2. DEGREE OF DAMAGE AND REQUIRED TIME
Type Degree of Damage Required Time
Bridge One pier and
two spans
Panel Bridge : 5 hr
Bypass Construction : 3 hr
Tunnel Demolition 50 m
from the entrance




Demolition 100 m Repair : 6 hr
Bypass : 7 hr
Road Demolition 150 m Repair : 5 hr
Bypass : 4 hr
Network data files, Table 6 in Appendix C and Table 11 in Appendix D,
include the multipliers for inflating the transit and recovery times. For example,
the recovery time will be assumed to be zero (c(l) = c(2) = 0) in case of no damage
or ruts only because the arc is used without repair or bypass. We assume that the
recovery time for partial destruction (c(3)) is 60 % of the recovery time for complete
destruction (c(4)). We can get c(4) from Table 4 in Appendix C and Table 9 in
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Appendix D. As for transit time, we get (1(0) from Table 5 in Appendix C and
Table 10 in App)endix D which is the transit time before interdiction (how these
times were determined will be described below). Though there is no damage, the
transit time will be increased due to psychological effects. In case of ruts only, we
can expect considerable delay because road manager forces do not repair or
construct a bypass. Furthermore, even with a segment fully repaired, a vehicle may
have a tendency to travel at a slower pace in an area that has recently undergone a
bombing attack. Consequently, we consider that d(l), d(2), d(3), and d(4) are
increased by certain multipliers. (Refer to the end of Table 6 in Appendix C and
Table 11 in Appendix D for details)
B. EXAMPLE 1 (KOREA)
Current operational planning for the defense of South Korea is focused on the
possibility of a North Korean surprise attack. It is estimated that North Korea may
maintain assault pressure with the prepared amounts of supplies in the frontal areas
for three days. On the fourth day, additional supplies would be needed for the
continued assault. Let us assume that it is the fourth day of the assault. We will
consider the network between Kaeseong and Sariwon to be as shown Figure 4. As
we can see in Figure 4, the actual road network is composed of 26 nodes and 38 arcs.
The source node is Sariwon and the sink node is Kaeseong. Kaeseong is near to the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and it is reasonably assumed that the North Korean
logistics command is located in Sariwon. This area is mainly composed of
mountains, rivers, and rice paddy fields. The road network is well developed in








Figure 4. Example Network (Korea)
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Data concerning North Korean equipment for transportation and road repair
is unavailable in an unclassified form. In lieu of this data, we used the U. S. Army
field manual [Ref. 8, 12, 13] to supply us with plausible data. We will now describe
the development of the recovery and transit time data used in the network data file
for the Korean scenario.
1. Recovery Time
The recovery time of an arc is the time required to repair a damaged
road segment or to construct a bypass. We will assume that all network attacks are
in the form of South Korean air strikes. We assume that eight sorties per day are
available to attack the network and two sorties are allocated for each target. These
are requirements which are imposed on strike aircraft operations in order to ensure
safety of flight. Therefore, the number of arcs to be attacked is four.
Let's assume that there are five engineering units in this area: Sariwon
(node 1), Packchon—ni (node 9), Chongdan (node 16), Kumcheon (node 18), and
Kaeseong (node 26).
By using the assumptions stated above, the data in Table 4 of
Appendix C was calculated. Column (1) of this table is the number of the arc (the
nodes each arc connects to are shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6). Column (2)
represents the types of targets: bridges, mountain roads, tunnels, and roads.
Column (3) is the distance in kilometers between the engineering unit and the
target. Column (4) is the movement time calculated from column (3) and is stated
in minutes. It is assumed that the speed of recovery personnel and equipment is 30
KM per hour. Columns (5) and (6) are repair time and bypass times expressed in
minutes. Column (7) gives the minimum of the previous two columns. Column (8)
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is the recovery time which is the sum of columns (4) and (7). Column (9) gives the
location of the nearest engineering unit to each target.
2. Transit Time and Cargo Requirements
As we discussed in Chapter III, we will choose open column
formations for traversing all arcs. The density per KM is 12 trucks and the speed of
each truck is 24 KM/H [Ref. 8: p.5—5]. The additional assumptions are no
exogenous traffic and concrete or bituminous pavement.
Transit times are called road clearance times in military terminology.
It is the total time a column or element thereof requires to travel over and clear
either a section or all of a road. Road clearance time equals the time distance plus
time length. Time distance is the time required to move from one point to another
at a given rate of speed. Time length (pass time) is the time required for a column,
or element thereof, to pass a given point [Ref. 8: p. F—2]. For application to the
real network, the transit time over an arc is assumed to be only the time distance
while the transit time of the last arc of each route, such as arcs 24 and 38, is the
time length plus the time distance. This is due to the fact that the convoy column
experiences the time length only at the end of their journey. Thus, only the last arc
of each path needs to have time length added. The formula for time distance [Ref.
8: p. F-9] is:
Time Distance = Distance / Rate ,
The formula for time length [Ref. 13: p. 3-57] is:
Time Length = (number of vehicle * 60) / (density * rate) + time gaps +EXTAL,
where EXTAL is the extra time allowance.
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In the above formulas, we know all of the required data except for the time gaps.
For time gaps, we need the vehicle gaps. In the open column, the density is 12
trucks per KM and the length of a truck is 17 feet (1 feet is 0.3048 meters). Thus,
the vehicle gap is:
Vehicle Gap = (1000-12 * 17 * 0.3048) / 11 = 85 (M).
In the open column, the traveling rate is 24 KM / H. So, the time gaps value is:
Time Gaps = (127 * 85 * 60) / 24000 = 27 (MIN).
The time length value is:
Time Length = (128 * 60) / (12 * 24) + 27 + 4 = 57 (MIN).
Table 5 includes the above information. Column (2) contains the length (Km) of
each arc; Column (3) lists time distance; Column (4) lists time length; and Column
(5) gives the transit time before interdiction.
3. Transit Time Comparison Between Two Models
Given the arc sets to be attacked, we will compare the results of two
models. The deterministic model used expected values of recovery times and transit
times, i.e.,
d(e) = 0.2d(l) + 0.2d(2) + 0.5d(3) + 0.1d(4),
c(e) = 0.2d(l) + 0.2d(2) 4- 0.5d(3) + 0.1d(4).
Outputs of the stochastic model was from 200 simulations. Table 7 of Appendix C
shows the results of 10 arc sets selected as reasonable interdiction possibilities from
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the C. choices(scenario 1). As we suggested in Chapter IV, the average network
transit times from the stochastic model were less than those for the deterministic
model except for the first, second, and tenth arc sets. The main reason for the
reversal for these three arc sets is that the recovery times have less influence on the
time—dependent transit time when the interdicted arcs are near the sink. So, in an
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attempt to increase the effects from such arcs, we multiplied recovery times by two
and reran the simulation. The results are presented in table 8 (scenario 2) of
Appendix C. As the reader can see in this table, the second and fourth arc sets still
behave contrary to our expectations. The reason is that the arc sets include arcs 24
and 38 which are the last arcs of each route. Recovery times have no influence on
the time—dependent transit time of these last arcs because they are repaired before
the convoy reaches them.
C. EXAMPLE 2 (CALIFORNIA)
The assumptions of Example 2 are similar to those of North Korea.
Therefore, we will use most of the same assumptions, and same procedures.
The area is between Gilroy and Carmel Valley Village. It is assumed that
Carmel Valley Village is the frontal area and the logistics command is located at
Gilroy. As we can see the Figure 5, the network is composed of 11 nodes and 15
arcs. The source node is Gilroy and the sink node is Carmel Valley Village.
1. Recovery Time
The structures which can be choke points are only bridges and roads
in this area. It is assumed that six sorties per day are available in this area and two
sorties are allocated for one target. Therefore, the number of arcs to be attacked is
three in any one arc set.
Let's assume that there are three engineering units in this area: Gilroy
(node 1), Castroville (node 6), and Carmel Valley Village (node 11). The data of
Table 2 is assumed applicable in this area also. Table 9 of Appendix D shows
recovery time data. The arc distances in Column (3) are expressed in miles. It is
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Figure 5. Example Network (California)
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2. Transit Time
For the open column, the density per mile is assumed to be 20 and the
speed is assumed to be 15 mph [Ref. 8: p.5-5]. Table 10 of Appendix D shows the
transit time data. Table 11 of Appendix D is the network data file which applies for
this example.
3. Transit Time Comparison Between Two Models
Table 12 of Appendix D shows of 10 arc sets selected as reasonable
15
interdiction possibilities from the C^ choices (scenario 3). The average network
transit times from the stochastic model were less than those for the deterministic
model except for the first and ninth arc sets. The main reason is the same to
scenario 1. Table 13 of Appendix D is for the case recovery time data is double that
of scenario 3 (scenario 4). In case of scenario 4, every selected arc set has the same
tendency, the transit times from the deterministic model is more than those from
the stochastic model.
D. GENERAL COMMENTS
In all of the scenarios we see the general tendency is that the expected
network transit time of the deterministic model is more than the average times of
the stochastic model except when the arcs to be attacked are near the sink. This
latter result is because the accumulated transit time to a node for such arcs is
usually more than the recovery time of the arc. Only when the recovery times
become large do those arcs recovery times affect the transit time through the net
work as we saw in scenarios 2 and 4. We also notice that, in those cases where the
deterministic expected time is larger than the average transit time from the
simulations, the deterministic times are also larger than the upper bound of the 95
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% confidence interval for the simulated times. Finally, we notice that the
differences between transit times of two models is significant and the results are, at
times, unpredictable.
The average decreases in transit time from the deterministic model to the
stochastic model and the width of the confidence interval are shown in Table 14.
As we can see from these examples, the transit time calculated using the
expected values is usually larger than the averages resulting from the stochastic
simulation. Using expected values in place of random variables would lead the
transportation manager to underestimate his ability to transport goods within a
required delivery time. On the other hand, using the expected value model to
determine the effectiveness of airstrikes to interdict flow of supplies leads to
overestimating this effectiveness. In cases where this effective interdiction is
critical, such as day four of a Korean conflict, this overestimation of effectiveness
could cause serious losses of troops and territory.
TABLE 14. DECREASE RATE AND CONFIDENCE INTERVAL














Vn. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
The goal of militaxy road network managers is to minimize the time required
to transport war materials to their front line troops. The opposing or interdicting
forces try to interdict some of the roads to maximize the transit time between the
supply source and the front lines by using a variety of means, particularly airstrikes.
If the transit time is greater than the required delivery time, the front line troops
must either curtail their activity or retreat from the frontal area. Accordingly, it is
to the advantage of the interdicting forces to delay the movement of materials as
long as possible.
The assumption that any attack is considered completely successful is far
from the real situation. The target damage may be complete, partial, or only ruts.
Also aircraft may be shot down by anti-aircraft gunfire including defensive air
patrol interceptors of the road managing forces. Probabilities of kill on the target
vary with the levels of pilots' skill, the opponent's anti—air capability, the exposure
time of aircraft, the type of munitions, hardness of targets, and so on. Therefore,
the level of the success of an attack must be modeled as probabilistic instead of
assuming that we always have completely successful destruction of the target.
If the relationships which comprise the model are simple enough, it may be
possible to use analytical methods (such as algebra, calculus or probability theory)
to obtain a direct optimal solution to questions of interest. However, most
real—world systems are too complex to allow the models to be evaluated
analytically, and the only resort left is to use computer simulation. In such a
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simulation we simulate a single occurrence of the events of the situation being
modeled. Repeated simulations provide data which can be used to estimate the
desired true characteristics of the model.
Our computer simulation program in Appendix B began by inputting the
network data file which contained all of the relevant information for the problems of
interest. We then entered a loop in which the pseudorandom attack successes were
calculated. The resulting deterministic time—dependent shortest path problem was
generated and solved using the Cooke and Halsey algorithm, and the resulting
shortest path length was recorded. This loop was repeated 200 times for a given set
of interdicted arcs. From the recorded statistics, the sample mean and sample
variance of the resulting transit time was calculated and an output file was built
which contained the results of the iterations, and the statistical summary.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The result of using the expected arc transit time values is to produce biased
solutions. The transit time calculated using the expected values tends to be larger
than the average values obtained from stochastic simulation. Using expected values
in place of random variables would lead the transportation manager to
underestimate his ability to transport goods within a required delivery time. On the
other hand, using the expected value model to determine the effectiveness of
airstrikes to interdict flow of supplies leads to overestimating this effectiveness when
transit time over the shortest route is the main concern. In cases where this
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effective interdiction is critical, this overestimation of effectiveness could cause
serious losses of troops and territory for either side. Therefore, the stochastic model
should be used in the real situation.
36
APPENDIX A. RANDOM CAPACITY IN MAXIMUM FLOW PROBLEM
A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
We performed a simple experiment involving a small maximum flow problem
on the network shown in Figure 3. We used coins and dice to generate random
capacities and calculated the resulting random maximum flows.
Figure 3. Maximum Flow Example Network
For random capacities, we used a dime, a quarter, a penny, a nickel, and a
die simultaneously to generate the values of a, b, c, d, and e,respectively. If a coin
flip results in a head, the capacity is 10, 25, 2, and 5 for arcs a, b, c, and
d,respectively. If a result is a tail, the capacity is 1. As for arc e, the value is the
face of die multiplied by two.
The expected value of the capacities are 5.5 for arc a, 13 for arc b, 1.5 for arc
c, 3 for arc d, and 7 for arc e.
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B. PROCEDURE AND OUTPUT COMPARISON
The maximum flow on the network using the expected capacities is 10.
Table 3 shows the output of random maximum flows, z, is the single commodity
maximum flow, and //• is the i sample mean after i independent experiments or
trials. Thus,
/^i
= ( S Zj.)/i
rTABLE 3. OUTPUT OF RANDOM MAXIMUM FLOWS
Trial a b c d e Zl /^i
1 10 25 1 5 2 7 7.00
2 1 1 2 5 6 2 4.50
3 10 1 1 1 2 3 4.00
4 10 25 2 5 8 13 6.25
5 10 25 1 5 2 7 6.40
6 1 25 1 1 8 9 6.83
7 1 25 2 1 10 11 7.43
8 1 1 1 1 12 2 6.75
9 10 25 1 1 4 5 6.56
10 1 1 1 1 12 2 6.10
11 1 25 1 1 4 5 6.00
12 1 25 1 5 4 5 5.92
13 1 1 2 5 8 2 5.62
14 10 1 2 1 2 3 5.43
15 1 25 2 1 8 9 5.66
16 1 25 2 1 6 7 5.75
17 1 25 1 5 4 5 5.71
18 10 25 2 1 10 11 6.00
19 1 1 1 5 10 2 5.79
20 10 25 1 1 8 9 5.95
21 10 25 1 1 12 13 6.29
22 10 25 1 1 8 9 6.41
23 1 25 2 5 4 9 6.52
24 1 1 1 1 4 2 6.33
25 1 1 1 1 8 2 6.16
26 10 25 2 5 4 9 6.27
27 10 25 2 1 6 7 6.30
28 1 25 1 5 4 5 6.25
29 1 25 1 1 4 5 6.21
30 10 1 2 5 6 8 6.27
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As we see from the table, //• stabilizes somewhere near 6.25. The amount of
flow calculated using the expected values is greater than the result of the thirty
stochastic simulations by a factor of 37.3 per cent. Using expected values in place of
random variables would lead the transportation manager to overestimate his ability
to transport goods.
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APPENDIX B. STOCHASTIC SIMULATION COMPUTER PROGRAM
program thesis
C
C Parameter statement must be Identical in each subroutine except
C for RAND and STATS
parameter! maxnod = 40, maxarc = 60, maxtyp = 5)
C
pararaeter( kseed = 3645)
C
real c tabl ( maxnod , maxnod), d tabl ( maxnod , maxnod )
,
St. c{maxarc, maxtyp), d(maxarc, Ormaxtyp), cdf(maxarc, maxtyp),
ft ztabl ( maxnod , maxnod), sum, sumsq, label ( maxnod
)
C
integer numnod, source, numtyp, numnrc, atakd ( maxarc )
,












do 1019 i = 1, numnod
do 1019 j = 1, numnod
ztabK i, j ) = 0.0
1019 continue
C
C Determine the number of simulation iterations to run
C
Print *, 'How many iterations would you like, sir?'
print *, 'Iterations = '




C Input the network structure in tlie subprogram READNET
C
call READNET( fname , head, tail, c, d, numtyp, numnod,





C print , 'Going from ', source, ' to ' , dest
C read (*,1) z
do 1011 kl = 1, numarc
if (atakd(kl ) .eq. 1 ) then
print *, 'Arc attacked: tail = ', tail(kl), ' head = ',





C 9191 is the big loop for the iterations
C
do 9191 kk = 1, iter
C
C Generate random construction and travel time tables
call RTABLE( ctabl , dtabl, tail, head, c, d, atakd,
& cdf, numtyp, numnod , numarc
)
C
C Debugging print statements
C print *, 'Dtable and Ctabl from the main after RTABLE'
C print *
C do 1009 i = 1, numnod
C wrlte(*, 10) (dtabKi, J), J = 1, numnod)
C009 continue
C write(*, *)
C do 1008 i = 1, numnod
C write!*, 10) (ctabl(i, j), J = 1, numnod)
COOS continue
C read {*,1) z
1 format ( al
)
10 format( 10( f8.3, 2x ) , / 10(f8,3, 2x ) / 10(f8.3, 2x ) /
& 10(f8.3, 2x))
C print *, 'The cdf for ', numtyp, 'types of destruction'
C print *
C do 1010 i = 1, numarc
C print *, (cdf(i, j), j = 1, numtyp)
COlO continue
C
C Call tlie solver with the generated table
C
call SPSOLVE( numnod , dtabl, ctabl, source, label)
C
C Debugging print statements
C
C print *, 'destck ', dest, 'here come labels'
C do 23 kl = 1, numnod





C Debugging print statements
C call outpt(label, numnod)
C
C Collecting statistics on tlie performance
C
sum = sum + label(dest)
sumsq = sumsq + ( label ( dcst ) **2 )




C read (*, 1) z
9191 continue
C
C Call the statistics subprof^ram
C







subroutine STATS (sum, sumsq, iter)
c
real sum, sumsq, riter
integer iter
C
riter = real ( iter
)
print *, 'your statistics sir '
xbar = sum / riter
print *, 'average = ', xbar
if ( i ter . eq . 1 ) then
print *, ' thats all we get for one iteration '
return
endi f
stddev = sqrt((sumsq - ((sum ** 2) * ( 1 /riter )))/( ri ter - 1))
print *, 'standard deviation', stddev
print , 'stdev of x-bar = ', stddev / sqrt(riter)
print *, ' for iter = ', iter
radl = 1.96 * stddev / sqrt(riter)
rad2 = 1.645 * stddev / sqrt(riter)





& + radl , ' ) '












subroutine SPSOLVE( numnod , dtabl, ctabl, source, label)
C
C
parameter ( maxnod = 40, maxarc = 60, maxtyp = 5)
integer numnod, source, curnod, node, prm(maxnod)
real dtabl ( maxnod , maxnod), c tabl ( maxnod , maxnod),
& curtim, label ( maxnod
)
C
C print *, 'Dtable and Ctable inside solver'
C do 1009 i = 1, numnod
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C do 1008 1=1, numnod
C write(*, 10) (ctabl(i, J), J = 1, numnod)
COOS continue
C read (*,1) z
1 format{al)
10 format(10( f8.3, 2x ) , / I0(f8.3, 2x) / 10(f8.3, 2x ) /
& 10(f8.3, 2x))
do 1000 1=1, numnod




C print *, 'SOURCE = ', source





C Find the time of travel from the current node to each of the
C adjacent nodes wliich are not permanently labeled. Find the miniraunr
C distanced node, iabel it permanent.
C
do 1001 iter = 1, numnod - 1
C print *, 'iteration ', iter, 'current node ', curnod, 'time ',
C 4 curtim
C print *, 'minlbl ', minlbl
minlbl = 99999
C read ( *
,
1 ) z
do 1002 node = 1, numnod
if ( prm( node ) . eq . ) then
if ( curt im
.
ge . ctnbl ( curnod , node)) then
label ( node
)
k = min( label ( node ) , curtim + dtabl ( curnod , node))
else
label ( node
& = min( label ( node ) , ctabl ( curnod , node ) + d tabl ( curnod , node )
>
endif









curtim = label ( minnod
)
prm( minnod ) = 1
curnod = minnod
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cC do 9999 1=1, numnod
C print , i, label(i)
C999 continue
C read (*,1) z
1001 continue
C do 90 i = 1 , numnod







subroutine RTADLE( ctabl , dtabl, tail, head, c, d, atakd,




parameter ( maxnod = 40, maxarc = 60, maxtyp = 5)
real c tabl ( maxnod , maxnod), d tabl ( maxnod , maxnod),
& c(maxarc, maxtyp), d(maxarc, 0:maxtyp), cdf (maxarc, maxtyp),
tc rand
Integer numnod, numarc, numtyp, tail ( maxarc ) , head( maxarc )
,





C print *, 'for arc 2: '
C do 19 i = 1 , numtyp
C write(*,2) 1, c{2, i), d(2, i), cdf(2, i)
C9 continue
2 format(' destr type ', 13, ' c = ', f8.3,' d = ',f8.3,' cdf = ',
& f8.3)
C read (*, 1) z
C
C Initialize the table
C
do 1001 i = 1 , numnod
do 1002 j = 1, numnod
ctabKi, j) = 99999




C Assign the proper construction and time-of- travels in the tables
C ctabl and dtabl
C
do 1005 1=1, numarc
if (atakd{ i) .eq.O) tJicn
C Assign tfie unliarassed travel distance and no construct, time
dtabl(head(i), tail{i)) = d(i, 0)
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ctabl(head(i) , tail(i)) = 0.0
dtabl(tail(i), head(i)) = d{i, 0)
ctabK tail(i), liead(l)) = 0.0
else
p = raiid( )
C Debug print
C
C print *, • P = ' . P
C
C Determine the type of destruction from the random probability
C p, and assign the construction and travel times accordingly
C
do 1003 J = 1, numtyp






dtabl(head(i), tall(i)) = d(i, type)
ctabl(head( i ) , tail(i)) = c(i, type)
dtabl(tail( i) , head(l)) = d(i, type)






C print *, 'Dtable and Ctable at the end of Rtable'
C do 1009 i = 1, numnod
C write!*, 10) (dtabl(i, j), J = 1, numnod)
COOy continue
C write(*, *)
C do 1008 1=1, numnod
C write(*, 10) (ctabld, J), J = 1, numnod)
COOS continue
C read (*,1) z
return
1 format ( al
)
10 format( 10( f8.3, 2x ) , / 10(f8.3, 2x ) / 10(f8.3, 2x) /





subroutine READNET{ fname , liead, tail, c, d, numtyp, numnod,
& numarc, abated, cdf, source, dest)
C
C
parameter! maxnod = 40, maxnrc = GO, maxtyp = 5)





, numarc , niimtyp, tail ( maxarc ) , head( maxarc ) ,




open(unit = 20, file = fname
)
C
C Read the network data and the attack plan
C
read(20, 100) chrlin
read(20, ) source, desL
C print *, 's = ', source, ' t = ', dest
read(20, *) numnod, numarc, numtyp
read(20, 100) chrlin
C print , numnod, numarc, numtyp
100 format(a80)
do 1000 1=1, numarc
read(20, *) arc, tall(l), l»cad(i), (c(i, type), type = 1,
ft. numtyp), (d(i, type), type = 0, numtyp), atakd(i)
1000 continue
C
C Read the probability of damage of each type and compute the cdf
C
read{20, 100) chrlin
C print *, 'numarc = ', numarc
do 1001 i = 1, numarc
read(20, *) arc, (prob(type), type = 1, numtyp)
C print *, i, arc, (prob(type), type = 1, numtyp)
cdf (i, 1 ) = probd )
do 1002 j = 2, numtyp








subroutine ou tpt ( arrive , numnod)
parameter( maxnod = 40, maxarc = 60, maxtyp = 5)




do 1000 i = 1, numnod










last Is the lost integer generated by t
parameter (L = 29, C = 217, xm = 1024.0)
real p
common last
last = mod(last * 1 + c, xm
)




APPENDIX C. TABLES AND NETWORK DATA FILE (EXAMPLE 1)
TABLE 4. RECOVERY TIME DATA (KOREA)
Arc Target Dist M.T. Rep Byp Cons Rec E. L
1 road 2 4 300 240 240 244 node 1
2 road 20 40 300 240 240 280 node 1
3 bridge 10 20 300 , 300 320 node 1
4 bridge 20 40 300 , 300 340 node 1
5 mtn.road 30 60 360 420 360 420 node 1
6 mtn.road 18 36 360 420 360 396 node 9
7 road 34 68 300 240 240 308 node 9
8 mtn.road 20 40 360 420 360 400 node 9
9 mtn.road 24 48 360 420 360 408 node 9
10 bridge 30 60 300 . 300 360 node 9
11 mtn.road 6 12 360 420 360 372 node 9
12 tunnel 10 20 1200 . 1200 1220 node 9
13 mtn.road 21 42 360 420 360 402 node 9
14 road 6 12 300 240 240 252 node 9
15 mtn.road 7 14 360 420 360 374 node 9
16 bridge 33 66 300 . 300 366 node 16
17 bridge 8 16 300 , 300 316 node 18
18 road 25 50 300 240 240 290 node 9
19 road 16 32 300 240 240 272 node 9
20 bridge 4 8 300 . 300 308 node 18
21 mtn.road 18 36 360 420 360 396 node 18
22 bridge 10 20 300 300 320 node 16
23 mtn.road 10 20 360 420 360 380 node 16
24 bridge 12 24 300 . 300 324 node 18
25 mtn.road 22 44 360 420 360 404 node 18
26 road 5 10 300 240 240 250 node 16
27 road 8 16 300 240 240 256 node 16
28 mtn.road 30 60 360 420 360 420 node 16
29 road 19 38 300 240 240 278 node 16
30 road 16 32 300 240 240 272 node 16
31 bridge 8 16 300 . 300 316 node 26
32 road 13 26 300 240 240 266 node 26
33 bridge 15 30 300 . 300 330 node 16
34 road 24 48 300 240 240 288 node 26
35 road 30 60 300 240 240 300 node 26
36 road 21 42 300 240 240 282 node 26
37 bridge 12 24 300 . 300 324 node 26
38 road 5 10 300 240 240 250 node 26
48
TABLE 5. TRANSIT TIME DATA (KOREA)
Arc Distance Time Distance Time Length d(0)
1 5 13 13
2 45 113 113
3 12 30 30
4 28 35 35
5 16 40 40
6 13 33 33
7 18 45 45
8 17 43 43
9 9 23 23
10 17 43 43
11 12 30 30
12 21 53 53
13 17 43 43
14 13 33 33
15 14 35 35
16 22 55 55
17 24 60 60
18 14 35 35
19 4 10 10
20 13 33 33
21 10 25 25
22 20 50 50
23 21 53 53
24 25 63 57 120
25 17 43 43
26 10 25 25
27 15 38 38
28 18 45 45
29 8 20 20
30 12 30 30
31 13 33 33
32 6 15 15
33 25 63 63
34 17 43 43
35 5 13 13
36 12 30 , 30
37 5 43 43
38 10 25 57 82
49
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, 237 .6 , 396,
, 184 .8 , 308,
, 240 .0 , 400,
.
244 .8 , 408,




, 732 .0 ,1220,
, 241 .2 , 402,
, 151 .2 , 252,
,
224 .4 , 374,
,















0, 153 6 256,
252 420,




0. 198. 0, 330,
0, 172. 8, 280,
0, 180. 0, 300,
0. 169. 2, 282,
0, 194. 4, 324,

































































































































d(4), atk (0 = no)
13 75, 14 375
123 75, 129 .375 1
33 00, 34 500 1
77 .00, 80 .500 ,
44 00, 46 000 ,
35 .75, 37 .375 , 1
49 .50, 51 .750
.
46 .75, 48 .875 ,
24 .75, 25 .875 >
46 .75, 48 .875 ,
33 .00, 34 .500
,
57 .75, 60 .375 , 1
46 .75, 48 .875 ,
35 .75, 37 .375 ,
38 .50, 40 .250 ,
60 .50, 63 .250 ,
66 00, 69 000
38 50, 40 250
11 00, 11 500
35 75, 37 375
27 50, 28 750
55 00, 57 500
57 75, 60 375
131 45 137 425
46 75, 48 875
27 50, 28 750
41 25, 43 125,
49 50, 51 750
22. 00, 23. 000,
33. 00, 34. 500,
35. 75, 37. 375,
16. 50, 17. 250,
68. 75, 71. 875,
46. 75, 48. 875,
13. 75, 14. 375,
33. 00, 34. 500,
13. 75, 14. 375,



















































20 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1
21 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1
22 0.2 0.2 0.5, 0.1
23 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1
24 0.2 0.2, 0.5 0.1
25 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1
26 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1
27 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1
28 0.2 0.2 0.5, 0.1
29 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1
30 0.2 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
31 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1
32 0.2 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
33 0.2 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
34 0.2 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
35 0.2 0.2, 0.5 0.1
36 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
37 0.2 0.2, 0.5 0.1
38 0.2 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
* c(3) = O.f) * c(4)
d(l) = 1.]L * d(0)
d(2) = 1.^\ * d(0)
d(3) = 1.]I * d(0)
d(4) = l.JL5 * <1(0)
51
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APPENDIX D. TABLES AND NETWORK DATA FILE (EXAMPLE 2)
TABLE 9. RECOVERY TIME DATA (CALIFORNIA)
Arc Target Dist M.T. Rep Byp Cons Rec E. L
1 bridge 5 10 300 180 180 190 node 1
2 road 6 12 300 240 240 252 node 1
3 bridge 12 24 300 180 180 204 node 1
4 road 10 20 300 240 240 260 node 1
5 road 10 20 300 240 240 260 node 6
6 bridge 5 10 300 180 180 190 node 6
7 road 3 6 300 240 240 246 node 6
8 road 9 18 300 240 240 258 node 6
9 road 6 12 300 240 240 252 node 6
10 bridge 3 6 300 , 300 306 node 6
11 bridge 13 26 300 , 300 326 node 6
12 road 13 26 300 240 240 266 node 11
13 road 15 30 300 240 240 270 node 11
14 road 7 14 300 240 240 254 node 11
15 road 8 16 300 240 240 256 node 11
TABLE 10. TRANSIT TIME DATA (CALIFORNIA)
Arc Distance Time Distance Time Length d(0)
1 19 76 76
2 9 36 36
3 14 56 56
4 2 8 8
5 9 36 36
6 12 48 48
7 5 20 20
8 8 32 32
9 9 36 36
10 15 60 60
11 10 40 40
12 9 36 36
13 4 16 16
14 9 36 57 93
15 13 52 57 109
54
TABLE 11. NETWORK DATA FILE
source
,
desit foi:Lowec1 by numnod. numarc;, numt;7V .
1 11
11 15 4
arc, T, H. c(l), cl[2), ., c(4),, d(0)1, d(l) » • • , d(4). atk (0 = no
)
1 1. 2, 0, 0, 114.0, 190, 76, 83.6, 106 .4, 83 .6, 87 .40,
2 1, 3, 0, 0, 151.2, 252, 36, 39.6, 50 .4, 39 .6, 41 .40,
3 2, 3, 0, 0, 122.4, 204, 56, 61.6, 78 .4, 61 .6, 64 .40,
4 ' 3, 4, 0, 0, 156.0, 260, 8, 8.8, 11 .2, 8 .8, 9 .20,
5 4, 5, 0, 0, 156.0, 260, 36, 39.6, 50 .4, 39 .6, 41 .40,
6 2, 6, 0, 0, 114.0, 190, 48, 52.8, 67 .2, 52 .8, 55 .20,
7 5, 6, 0, 0, 147.6, 246, 20, 22.0, 28,.0, 22,.0, 23,,00, 1
8 5, 7, 0, 0, 154.8, 258, 32, 35.2, 44..8, 35,.2, 36.,80, 1
9 6, 7, 0, 0, 151.2, 252, 36, 39.6, 50. 4, 39..6, 41..40, 1
10 6, 8, 0, 0, 183.6, 306, 60, 66.0, 84.,0, 66..0, 69.,00,
11 7, 9, 0, 0, 195.6, 326, 40, 44.0, 56. 0, 44. 0, 46..00,
12 8, 9, 0, 0, 159.6, 266, 36, 39.6, 50. 4, 39.,6, 41.,40,
13 8, 10, 0, 0, 162.0, 270, 16, 17.6, 22. 4, 17. 6, 18. 40,
14 9, 11, 0, 0, 152.4, 254, 93, 102.3, 130. 2, 102. 3, 106. 95,
15 10, 11. 0, 0, 153.6, 256, 109, 119.9, 152. 6, 119. 9, 125. 35,
arc,p( 1 ) ,p(2 ) , . .
,
P(4)
1 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
2 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
3 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
4 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
5 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
6 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
7 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
8 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
9 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
10 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
11 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
12 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
13 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
14 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
15 0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.1
* c(3) = 0.6 * c(4)
d(l) = 1.1 * d(0)
d(2) = 1.4 * d(0)
d(3) = 1.1 * d(0)
d(40 = 1.15 * d{0)
55
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